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Alliances With Competitors: How to
Combine and Protect Key Resources?
Will Mitchell, Pierre Dussauge and Bernard Garrette
Our study addresses two main questions: First, what types of alliances do firms tend to create
when combining different kinds of resources? Second, what governance mechanisms do
firms set up to coordinate and protect resources when they use them for different alliances?
We examine 227 alliances between competitors in Asia, North America, and Europe. We first
identify two types of alliances: scale alliances in which the partner firms contribute similar
resources, and link alliances in which the partners contribute complementary resources. We
find that firms contributing R&D and production resources tend to form scale alliances,
while firms contributing marketing resources tend to enter into link alliances. We also find
that firms are more likely to choose stronger protection mechanisms for link alliances, which
create greater appropriation risks, while they tend to seek higher levels of coordination in
scale alliances.
Creating and Protecting Resources:
Formation and Governance of Scale
And Link Alliances Between
Competitors
T
his study examines the formation of
strategic alliances, with the goal of
moving us toward a more general under-
standing of the relationship between two
streams of strategy research. During the past
two decades, two major themes concerning
firm-specific resources have emerged within
the field of strategy. First, since Nelson and
Winter’s (1982) and Wernerfelt’s (1984) argu-
ments revived and developed earlier insights
from Edith Penrose (1959) and others, many
strategy researchers have focused on the role
of firm-specific resources in shaping a firm’s
competence. Second, building on William-
son’s (1975, 1985) work concerning the appro-
priation risks associated with idiosyncratic
resources, much research attention has focused
on identifying mechanisms by which firms
protect the value of their resources. Follow-
ing Williamson (1999), we will refer to these
themes as the governance and competence
perspectives on strategy. The competence and
governance themes have developed in parallel,
with some attempts to integrate the arguments
but, more often, with competence and govern-
ance researchers talking past each other. We
attempt to bring together these themes by
studying the types of resources and types of
governance mechanisms that firms use when
forming alliances with competitors in order to
increase efficiency in their existing activities
(scale alliances) or to expand into new activities
or markets (link alliances).
On two key dimensions, concerning con-
ceptual systemization and units of analysis,
the two strands of research have different
strengths and weaknesses. First, the two
strands have proceeded with different em-
phasis on conceptual systemization and gen-
eralizability. Governance research has been
relatively systematic. Williamson and those
who have drawn on his insights have devel-
oped a cohesive logic that underlies the
identification and protection of idiosyncratic
resources (e.g., Williamson, 1991b). Compe-
tence research tends to be somewhat more
fragmented. At this point, there is at least a
partial consensus in the strategy field that
resources exist and that they influence what
firms do (e.g., Barney, 1986; Conner, 1991;
Amit & Shoemaker, 1993). Many studies now
use competence arguments as research moti-
vations, sometimes by inferring the existence
of resources and other times by explicitly oper-
ationalizing dimensions of resources (e.g.,
Mitchell, 1991; Henderson & Cockburn, 1994;
Karim & Mitchell, 2000). Despite the common
usage, though, there is little consensus about
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how to generalize the concept of resources or
how to identify general influences of re-
sources on strategic action. On the system-
ization dimension, therefore, governance
research has proceeded somewhat farther
than competence research.
Second, the two strands have emphasized
different units of analysis. Governance research
has emphasized individual transactions as
units of analysis, emphasizing contractual
and organizational modes by which firms
can protect the value of transaction specific
assets that relate to particular exchanges.
While this approach has offered conceptual
clarity, the approach has also tended to
under-emphasize the intertwined nature of
many transactions, in the sense that firms
often must make decisions that affect many
exchanges, involving many different assets.
Competence research, by contrast with govern-
ance research, tends to address more aggre-
gated units of analysis, involving intertwined
sets of physical assets and organizational
systems that together provide key influences
on what firms do and how they perform.
Competence research often stresses the role of
the firm in coordinating the development and
use of firm-specific resources. With respect to
units of analysis, competence research may
come closer than governance research to
many of the inter-twined strategic issues that
firms face.
We attempt to bring together the compe-
tence and governance arguments to investi-
gate how firms undertake a particular type of
strategic action, alliances among competitors.
We focus on two questions. First, what types
of resources do firms tend to use for different
types of alliances? Second, what governance
mechanisms do firms use to create and
protect resources when they use them for
different alliances? We have three conceptual
goals. First, we attempt to show that the
nature of a firm’s resources influences its
strategy choices; in doing so, we build on
competence research that offers elements of a
general framework for identifying resources.
Second, we attempt to demonstrate how
incentives to create and protect firm-specific
resources tend to influence managerial action.
Third, at a more specific level, the study helps
describe the multiple roles that alliances be-
tween competitors play in modern economies,
as firms attempt to reinforce their strategic
positions in their existing markets and expand
throughout the world.
Studying alliances between competitors
provides a suitable context for exploring
issues that arise from competence and gov-
ernance arguments. The competence view of
the firm suggests that firms’ competitive
advantages derive from their preferential
access to idiosyncratic resources, especially
resources that stem from tacit knowledge-
based routines (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt,
1984; Conner, 1991; Amit & Shoemaker,
1993). Although firms gain advantages from
possessing idiosyncratic resources, strategists
and organizational theorists dating to Com-
mons (1934), Coase (1937), Barnard (1938),
Simon (1957), Richardson (1972), and others
have long recognized that no one business
can create all resources needed to prosper and
grow. Authors in several research traditions
argue that interfirm alliances provide a means
of pooling resources held by different firms in
order to exploit new business opportunities
and to increase the efficiency of existing
business activities. Collaboration is often an
effective way of pooling resources that are
subject to a high degree of knowledge-based
market failure because interfirm collaboration
helps facilitate ongoing interpersonal contact
between the allied firms (Itami & Roehl, 1987;
Mitchell & Singh, 1993, 1996; Gulati, 1998).
Moreover, collaboration provides a means for
firms to protect the value of their resources
through financial and organizational safe-
guards against opportunistic behavior (Teece,
1986; Hennart, 1988; Bresser, 1988; Kogut,
1988; Jorde & Teece, 1990; Williamson, 1991a;
Chi, 1994). At the same time, firms usually
cannot fully protect their resources from
appropriation by partners, because the same
organizational and individual processes that
help pool the firms’ resources also tend to
expose the resources to the partners (Zajac
& Olsen, 1993; Sobrero & Roberts, 1996).
Although firms can attempt to create credible
bilateral commitments that align the resource
coordination, creation, and protection incen-
tives of the partners (Oxley, 2001), complete
alignment is often impossible owing to the
multiplicity of organizational and personal
interactions and incentives that arise during
the course of an alliance. Thus, collaboration
provides a variety of potential benefits that
stem from the combination of partner re-
sources, as well as potential risks that firms
will attempt to minimize by choosing the best
available governance mechanisms.
Our empirical analysis examines 227 alli-
ances between competitors in Asia, North
America, and Europe between 1952 and 1996.
The alliances include firms operating in the
telecom-electronics, auto, aerospace, and
other sectors. The industries in the sample
tend to be oligopolistic, open to international
trade, R&D intensive, subject to significant
economies of scale, and globally competitive.
Alliances in such industries offer a high
potential for efficiency gains and expansion
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benefits, with few opportunities for limiting
competition (Jacquemin, Buigues & Ilzkovitz,
1989; Millington & Bayliss, 1995).
Background and Predictions
Assumptions and implications for alliances
Table 1 reviews our basic assumptions.
Williamson (1999) argues that a theory of
the firm must specify five conceptual ele-
ments, including behavioral assumptions,
units of analysis, description of the firm,
purpose of the firm, and efficiency criteria.
Williamson also argues that conceptual argu-
ments require empirical testing. We outline
the assumptions and discuss their implica-
tions for alliances. We then attempt to test
predictions that arise from the conceptual
base in the empirical context of alliances
between competitors.
Our behavioural assumptions include poten-
tial self-interest plus bounded rationality with
firm-specific foresight. The implication for alli-
ances of potential self-interest and bounded
rationality is that alliance contracts are not
self-enforcing, so that firms must organize
alliances in ways that protect their resources
as well as use other firms’ resources and
create new resources. We assume that econ-
omic actors have the capacity to look ahead
and recognize opportunities and risks, but
that a firm’s experience shapes its foresight.
This assumption of firm-specific foresight
suggests that firms commonly recognize
potential opportunities to gain efficiencies or
expansion via alliances with other organiz-
ations, but that different firms will have
different expectations about the potential
outcome of an alliance. Because of different
expectations, the allies may create asymmetric
governance mechanisms.
Table 1. Assumptions
Elements of theory Governance perspective Competence perspective Competence perspective:
Alliance implications
1. Behavioral assumptions Bounded rationality, with
foresight; potential self-interest.
Bounded rationality, with firm-
specific foresight; potential self-
interest.
Firms must organize alliances in
ways that protect their resources
as well as use other firms’
resources and create new
resources. Partners may have
different perspectives on alliance
purposes and governance.
2. Units of analysis Transactions Routines (tacit, co-specialized,
organizationally-embedded),
which combine to form
resources. Use of resources
generates value. Production
costs are outcomes of resources.
Routines and resources are
imperfectly tradeable. Firms
often need alliances to gain
access to other organizations’
resources.
3. Description of the firm Structure for governing
transactions. Governance
emphasizes protection.
Structure for governing routines
and resources. Governance
includes coordination, creation,
and protection.
Firms require mechanisms to
govern the use of routines and
resources that they use in
alliances.
4. Purposes served Economizing on sum of
production costs & transaction
costs, where transaction costs
stem from alignment between
transaction attributes &
governance structure of current
and future transactions. Takes
production costs as exogenous to
firm.
Economizing on the sum of
production costs and governance
costs. Multi-faceted cost
dimensions create substantial
ambiguity concerning
economizing choices and scope
for self-interested choices.
A firm’s governance
mechanisms for inter-
organizational resources must
attempt to coordinate and
protect the value of current
resources, plus create and
protect the value of new
resources.
5. Efficiency criterion Relative efficiency of overall set
of current and future firm
transactions, based on feasible
alternatives.
Relative efficiency of current and
future use of overall set of firm
resources, based on feasible
alternatives.
A firm seeks the best available
mechanisms for jointly
protecting and creating
resources that fall within the
activities of an alliance.
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Our fundamental unit of analysis is the
routine, which closely relates to the concept of
resources. Routines are identifiable patterns of
activity embodied in human or capital assets
(Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 1990; Dosi,
Marengo & Fagiolo, 1996) and contain much
of the knowledge of what a firm can accom-
plish (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Routines
consist of multiple related transactions that
take place over time either within a firm or
via interaction with external parties. Routines
are often tacit, either because they are intrin-
sically uncodifiable or because they require
the interactive participation of multiple people.
Routines also tend to be co-specialized with
other routines and to be embedded in broader
organizational contexts.
Several routines combine together to create
particular resources. Resources, which we
view as synonymous with capabilities, are
stocks of knowledge, skills, financial assets,
physical assets, human capital, and other
tangible and intangible factors (Wernerfelt,
1984; Grant, 1991; Amit & Schoemaker, 1993).
Resources tend to be only semi-decomposable
into their underlying routines, so that re-
sources also provide relevant units of analy-
sis, in addition to routines. In our discussion
of alliances, we will emphasize the joint use of
firms’ resources as the purpose of alliances.
We will refer to a resource typology that in-
cludes R&D, production, and marketing re-
sources (Capron, Dussauge & Mitchell, 1998).
Firms create new resources by creating new
routines and recombining existing routines in
novel ways. Resources and their underlying
routines are often firm-specific and imper-
fectly tradable, owing to their tacitness, co-
specialization and organizational nature.
The need for alliances arises from the
imperfect tradability of routine and resources.
Firms often need to ally with other organiz-
ations in order to extract value from under-
utilized resources they possess, either through
more efficient use of existing resources or by
creating new resources. Allying firms may
pool similar resources in order to gain greater
efficiency, so long as increased economies of
scale more than outweigh the governance cost
of alliances. In addition, allying firms may
wish to combine the routines that underlie
different types of resources in order to create
valuable new resources, again accounting for
governance costs.
Our description of the firm and our view of
the purpose of the firm involve assumptions
concerning the role of the firm in governing
resources. We describe a firm as a governance
structure, where governance includes coordi-
nating the use of existing resources, creating
new resources, and protecting the value of
resources. This view closely follows Coriat
and Dosi (1998), who argue that a firm is a
particular set of routines that result from the
co-evolution between corporate patterns of
knowledge distribution and mechanisms of
governance. Governance mechanisms include
formal and informal incentive and control
systems, legal regimes, organizational struc-
tures, and corporate cultures (Argyres, 1996;
Liebeskind, 1996). Governance mechanisms
are often shaped by path dependency and
local search, which arise from the tacitness,
co-specialization, and organizational em-
beddedness of routines. In turn, the purpose
of the firm is to economize on the combina-
tion of production and governance costs. Our
approach implies that production costs are
partly an endogenous outcome of firm-specific
resources and governance mechanisms. That
is, production costs vary with the nature of a
firm’s resources and the effectiveness with
which a firm governs the use and creation of
resources.
The alliance implication of our assumptions
concerning the description and purpose of the
firm is that a firm must create governance
mechanisms for its inter-organizational activi-
ties. A firm’s inter-organizational governance
mechanisms must attempt to increase and pro-
tect the value of the firm’s current resources,
as well as create and protect the value of new
resources (Child & Faulkner, 1998). Thus, the
inter-organizational governance mechanisms
need to address resource coordination to en-
sure efficient use of current resources and
resource creation to support expansion, as well
as protection of the value of the resources that
fall within the coordination and creation
activities of the alliance.
Our efficiency criterion is of the best
available value of current and future use of
routines, by which we mean that a firm seeks
the best available mechanisms to jointly
protect and create resources. In this paper,
our emphasis will be on factors that differ-
entiate the types of resources that firms use
for alliances that create either efficiency or
expansion opportunities, along with the pro-
tection mechanisms that the firms use to
protect the value of the resources.
Overall, our conceptual approach combines
the protection emphasis of governance re-
search with the coordination emphasis of the
competence research. The key difference
between our approach and transaction cost
economics, which is the core theory of the
governance approach, is that we focus on
routines rather than individual transactions.
In turn, this leads us to emphasize coordina-
tion and creation roles for governance in
addition to a protection role. This dual
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emphasis on protection and creation credits
the firm with a critical coordination role in
both enhancing the value of existing re-
sources and creating new resources. Our
focus on routines as the fundamental unit
brings our approach close to that of evolu-
tionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982),
with the primary difference being that we
focus on relationships among firms in the use
of resources rather than on independent
search activities by single firms.
Our summary argument concerning alli-
ances is that alliances provide opportunities
for firms to pool imperfectly tradable re-
sources in order to gain greater efficiency in
the use of existing resources as well as
opportunities to create new resources. The
firms must create governance mechanisms
that both combine the resources effectively
and protect the value of the resources. The
nature of the resources creates incentives to
seek either efficiency or expansion benefits
from the alliance. Some types of resources
provide greater potential for efficiency gains,
when a firm accounts for the governance costs
of creating and protecting the resources as
well as potential scale economies. Other types
of resources provide greater opportunities for
expansion gains, again accounting for govern-
ance costs. We will focus on two types of
alliances (link and scale), two sets of resources
(geographic and functional), and two sets of
governance mechanisms (equity holdings and
joint ventures). We first develop predictions
concerning the types of resources that firms
will tend to use for link and scale alliances.
We then develop predictions concerning
governance mechanisms that the firms will
use to protect and create resources in the two
types of alliances.
Formation of link and scale alliances
Industry analysts and academic researchers
report a growing incidence and importance of
alliance activity among competitors for many
purposes, including technology and product
development, joint manufacturing, and market
entry (Doz, 1996; Harbison and Pekar, 1998;
Park & Russo, 1996; Sakakibara, 1997). Increas-
ingly, researchers distinguish between two
basic types of alliances between competitors,
which we refer to as link alliances and scale
alliances (Porter & Fuller, 1986; Hennart,
1988; Dussauge, Garrette & Mitchell, 2000).
The distinction between link and scale alliances
arises from the symmetry or asymmetry of the
partners’ resource contributions to an alliance,
which reflect different strategic purposes
(Dussauge & Garrette, 1997). Scale alliances
are partnerships to which partners contribute
similar resources, while link alliances are
partnerships to which partners contribute
substantially different resources. Scale alli-
ances allow firms to gain greater efficiency in
their existing business activities, while link
alliances allow firms to combine complemen-
tary resources in order to expand their
business activities. This distinction is similar
to Sakakibara (1997), who defines alliances in
terms of cost-sharing and skill-sharing moti-
vation. We define the concept of scale and
link alliances on the basis of the similarity or
difference in the resources that the partner
firms contribute to the alliance. Empirically,
we examine three types of resources, includ-
ing R&D resources, production resources, and
marketing resources.
Although a substantial literature addresses
alliance formation (e.g., Harrigan, 1985; Teece,
1986; Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Hennart,
1988; Kogut, 1988; Oliver, 1990; Williamson,
1991a), this literature has not fully explored
the strategic factors that differentiate incen-
tives to ally with competitors for expansion or
efficiency. In particular, it is not clear which
resources firms tend to use for efficiency and
expansion purposes when they ally with
competitors or, in turn, how the firms govern
the use of resources in link and scale alliances.
Although both scale and link alliances may
create advantages for the allying firms, the
nature of the advantages differ (Dussauge &
Garrette, 1995). Because they are based on
similar contributions from the partner firms,
scale alliances produce significant economies
of scale for collaborative activities, thereby
allowing the firms to reduce excess capacity
(Hennart, 1988). Such scale alliances can
include joint R&D efforts, the joint production
of a component or end product, or joint
marketing of the allies’ goods. Such scale
alliances provide a way of avoiding, or at
least postponing, mergers in industries un-
dergoing strong concentration processes.
Link alliances, in contrast with scale alli-
ances, combine complementary resources
from the partners (Porter & Fuller, 1988).
Link alliances include partnerships in which
one partner provides market access to pro-
ducts that another firm developed, such that
the two allies create a form of customer-
supplier relationship. Therefore, link alliances
create opportunities for the partnering firms
to undertake immediate expansion within
the current markets of one or other of the
partners. In addition, link alliances create
opportunities for firms to learn from their
partners and to use this learning as the basis
for future expansion beyond the scope of
the alliance (Hamel, 1991; Khanna, Gulati &
Nohria, 1998; Dussauge, Garrette & Mitchell,
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2000). Link alliances sometimes involve joint
manufacturing, as long as the other compo-
nents of the value-chain remain distributed
between the partners.
A central proposition of this paper is that
partners will tend to use different types of
resources in alliances, depending on whether
the firms seek efficiency or expansion benefits
from the alliance. In order to predict the
relationship between particular types of re-
sources and alliance types, we distinguish
several dimensions of geographic and func-
tional resources. Tables 2a and 2b list the
resources, along with several control vari-
ables. We first discuss geographic resources,
next turn to functional resources, and then
outline several other strategic factors that
might underlie the formation of scale and
link alliances.
By geographic resources, we mean the re-
sources that arise as a result of a firm’s ac-
tivities in different geographic home markets.
A literature that focuses on distinctions
among national innovation infrastructures
(Nelson, 1991) suggests that firms based in
different geographic contexts tend to develop
differing resources. We use two aspects of
geographic resources, including the parents’
geographic origins and the alliance’s geo-
graphic market.
We expect expansion incentives to be par-
ticularly strong for alliances involving firms
with disparate national origins. Firms based in
different countries can often combine different
complementary resources in link alliances that
draw on their different national environments
to create expansion opportunities. In order to
explore the impact of increasingly divergent
geographic origins, we will distinguish em-
pirically between parents from the same
country, parents from different countries
within a single continent, and parents from
different continents.
Hypothesis 1a. Alliances between compe-
titors with different geographic origins are
more likely to be link alliances than scale
alliances.
By contrast, we expect that alliances cover-
ing broader geographic markets will offer
Table 2a. Alliance Formation Factors
H Alliance formation factors Type Resource combination opportunities
H1a Different geographic origins of
parents
Link Combine resources that draw on different national environments to create new
resources needed to expand activities.
H1b Broader geographic market
coverage
Scale Combine similar resources to achieve scale needed for greater sales in more extensive
markets.
H2a R&D resources Scale Link alliances involving R&D resources create expansion opportunities, but also create
appropriation risks. Firms are most likely to combine R&D with a competitor for
greater scale, which has a longer term commercialization horizon, than to contribute
their R&D resources to a competitor’s production or marketing resources, which would
have immediate competitive risks.
H2b Production resources Scale Combine production resources to achieve scale efficiency.
H2c Marketing resources Link Use one firm’s marketing resources to sell goods that use another firm’s development
or production resources.
Multiple functional resources ? The incentives of one type of resource may tend to dominate the other, or there may be
substantial heterogeneity.
H3a Competitive asymmetry Link In link alliances, relative size is not be an issue so long as a partner possesses needed
resource. By contrast, it often is not worth while for a firm to engage in a scale alliance a
smaller partner, because the cost of collaborating will exceed the expected scale
benefits.
H3b Number of partners Scale Scale economies opportunities increase with multiple partners, while governance costs
for disparate resources in link alliances increase with multiple partners.
Year ? Expansion opportunities might have arisen more frequently in recent years, but firms
have long had incentives to ally for expansion. Recent competitive pressure may have
increased the incentives to undertake scale alliances for greater efficiency.
Prior alliances among partners ? Allies with prior experience might be more willing to undertake expansion
opportunities together, but experience might also lead to independent competition for
expansion opportunities rather than continued cooperation.
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greater opportunities for economies of scale
and thus will tend to be scale alliances.
Broader market coverage offers a greater
potential for efficiency gains which, in turn,
requires greater business scale; this creates
incentives for partners to pool similar re-
sources within scale alliances in order to
achieve efficient size. For example, global
markets offer particularly strong oppor-
tunities for firms to increase efficiency by
pooling similar resources and therefore favor
the formation of scale alliances. In contrast,
fragmented markets require access to locally-
specific resources in order for firms to expand
internationally, which, in turn, tends to lead
to the formation of link alliances. We will
distinguish empirically between alliances that
sell goods within a single continent (few
alliances in our sample limit their sales to a
single country) and alliances that sell goods
across multiple continents.
Hypothesis 1b. Alliances between compe-
titors that provide sales coverage for broader
geographic markets are more likely to be
scale alliances than link alliances.
We now turn to functional resources. By
functional resources, we mean resources that
firms use for R&D, production, and market-
ing. Several typologies in the literature that
has become known as the resource-based
view of the firm suggest classes of functional
resources. Amit and Schoemaker (1993) dis-
tinguish between R&D resources (technological
resources, R&D resources, product develop-
ment speed), manufacturing resources, and
marketing resources (brand management, dis-
tribution channels, buyer-seller relationships,
user base, customer service, business reputa-
tion). Similarly, Teece and Pisano (1994) and
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) distinguish
between technological resources, production
resources, and customer-related resources.
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) distinguish
between R&D resources, production resources,
and marketing resources. Three categories of
functional resources stand out in these dis-
cussions, together encompassing the commer-
cialization sequence of product development,
production, and marketing. Capron, Dussauge,
and Mitchell (1998) show that R&D, produc-
tion, and marketing resources are particularly
common targets for inter-business usage fol-
lowing business acquisitions, while Dussauge,
Garrette, and Mitchell (2000) show that the
three types of resources are important elements
of alliance activity. In addition to functional
R&D, production, and marketing resources,
one might also investigate the complementary
functions of general management and financial
support (Barney, 1986; Teece, 1986; Chatterjee
& Wernerfelt, 1991; Teece, Pisano & Shuen,
1997; Capron, Dussauge & Mitchell, 1998). For
this paper, we will focus on the three-part
functional sequence of R&D, production, and
marketing resources.
When competing firms ally, we expect scale
efficiency incentives to be particularly strong
for alliances that involve R&D or production
resources. R&D resources may offer substan-
tial opportunities for link alliances in order to
expand, but such link alliances involving R&D
resources would create appropriation risks
when combined with a competitor’s produc-
tion or marketing resources (Hamel, 1991;
Hennart, Roehl & Zietlow, 1999). Therefore,
we expect firms to be reluctant to combine
their R&D resources in link alliances with
competitors. Instead, when forming link
alliances, firms will often exclude R&D re-
sources from the activities of the alliance and
will contribute only outputs of their proprie-
tary R&D resources, such as existing designs
and previously developed products. In con-
trast, firms are most likely to pool R&D re-
sources with a competitor in order to achieve
greater scale, which has a longer-term com-
mercialization horizon and lesser immediate
risks. In addition, because all partners con-
tribute R&D resources in scale alliances, the
mutual hostage situation thus created limits
opportunism (Oxley, 2001).
Hypothesis 2a. Competing firm alliances
that involve R&D resources are more likely
to be scale alliances than link alliances.
Production resources often offer opportu-
nities for two or more firms to pool resources
in order to achieve efficient size. Because of
the extent of scale economies and experience
effects in production, firms possessing under-
utilized production resources will often form
alliances with partners that contribute similar
resources in order to achieve efficient size or
reduce excess capacity. Therefore, we expect
the efficiency potential created by alliances
involving production activities to lead to the
formation of scale alliances rather than link
alliances.
Hypothesis 2b. Competing firm alliances
that involve production resources are more
likely to be scale alliances than link
alliances.
We expect expansion incentives to be par-
ticularly strong for competing-firm alliances
that involve marketing resources. Alliances
involving marketing activities provide oppor-
tunities to expand by using one firm’s
marketing resources in order to sell goods
based on another firm’s development or
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production resources. Thus, marketing link
alliances will often use one firm’s marketing
systems to sell the other partner’s products,
rather than combine one partner’s production
or R&D resources with the other competitor’s
marketing resources in order to produce and
market a new product specifically developed
within the scope of the alliance.
Hypothesis 2c. Competing firm alliances
that involve marketing resources are more
likely to be link alliances than scale
alliances.
To test hypotheses 2a to 2c, we will compare
alliances that involve only a single functional
resource to alliances that involve combinations
of different types of resources. We expect the
prediction to hold for alliances that involve
only one type of resource. That is, we expect
alliances involving only R&D or production
resources to tend to be scale alliances, while
alliances involving only marketing resources
to tend to be link alliances.
1 We do not have
uniform expectations concerning alliances
that combine marketing resources with R&D
and/or production resources. In such cases,
it is possible that the market expansion in-
centives for link alliances may dominate or,
conversely, that the R&D and production
protection and efficiency incentives for scale
alliances will dominate.
We will consider four other firm-level
factors that also might underlie competitors’
alliance formation. These four variables include
asymmetric competitive strength, number of
partners, year of formation, and prior alliance
experience.
Competitive asymmetry is likely to favor
link alliances, in which the partners attempt
to create expansion opportunities. In link
alliances, the firms seek partners with com-
plementary skills and capabilities. Provided a
partner possesses the needed skills, its rela-
tive size should not arise as an issue in link
alliances. By contrast, if partners seek econ-
omies of scale, each partner will only agree to
engage in the collaboration if the increased
volume that the other partner contributes is
large enough to produce savings that will
outweigh the costs of governing the collab-
oration. In other words, it often is not worth
while for a firm to engage in a scale alliance
with a smaller partner, because the govern-
ance cost of collaborating will exceed the
expected scale benefits. This argument is
consistent with Hennart’s (1988) transaction
cost theory of joint ventures. The argument
also corresponds to the view of Porter and
Fuller (1986), who argue that partners that
have dissimilar strengths and weaknesses
tend to form X coalitions (link alliances).
Hypothesis 3a: Alliances involving com-
petitors with asymmetric competitive posi-
tions are more likely to be link alliances
than scale alliances.
Alliances with more than two partners are
more likely to favor efficiency gains than to
create expansion opportunities. Indeed, scale
economies tend to increase with the number
of partner firms involved in an alliance, thus
creating incentives to form scale alliances. The
very similarity in the partners’ contributions
tends to keep governance costs relatively low.
In contrast, combining complementary re-
sources of multiple partner firms becomes
increasingly complex and increases govern-
ance costs, while, at the same time, the
incremental contribution of each additional
partner to the expansion potential of the
alliance tends to decrease. Moreover, appro-
priation risks are likely to increase with the
number of partners involved in the alliance.
Therefore, we expect most multiple partner
alliances to be scale alliances.
Hypothesis 3b: Alliances involving more
than two partner firms are more likely to
be scale alliances than link alliances.
The influences of the other two firm-level
factors that might tend to favor either link
or scale alliances, formation year and prior
alliance experience, are ambiguous. Alliances
formed in more recent years might tend to
involve expansion, if popular perceptions
about changes in alliance objectives are
correct, but, alternatively, alliances have long
been important to firm expansion so that
there is no clear prediction. Allies with prior
experience in alliances together might be
more willing to undertake expansion oppor-
tunities together. Alternatively, experience
might also lead to independent competition
for expansion opportunities, so that prior
experience might be predict scale alliances
rather than link relationships.
It would be desirable also to control for
differential industry growth and concentra-
tion as influences on alliance formation, but
the multi-period and multi-national scope of
this study makes such measurement im-
possible. The focus of our argument is on
firm-level issues, however, rather than on
industry-level trends. Moreover, the industry
variables help address differences across
economic sectors, while the alliance founding
year and geographic variables help address
inter-period and inter-region differences.
In summary, the hypotheses address the
tendency of competing firms to use geo-
graphic resources and functional resources
for scale and link alliances. We expect that
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scale alliances among competitors will pri-
marily involve R&D resources, production
resources, broad geographic market coverage,
competitors with similar competitive posi-
tions and multiple partners. We expect that
link alliances will emphasize marketing re-
sources, competitors with different geographic
origins, and competitors with asymmetric
competitive positions.
Governance mechanisms for
protecting, coordinating, and
creating resources
Scale and link alliances tend to require
different governance mechanisms. We expect
the mechanisms to reflect the need to co-
ordinate the use of existing resources in scale
alliances and create new resources in link
alliances, while also protecting the value of
resources in either case. As we noted earlier,
we will focus on resources as the analytic unit,
subsuming the concept of routines within
that of resources. We will examine two sets
of governance mechanisms, including parent
equity holdings and joint venture structures.
The two governance choices have different im-
plications for resource coordination, creation,
and protection. Table 2b summarizes the
variables and predictions.
Parent equity holdings arise as a means of
protecting firms from opportunistic behavior
by partners, because the firms either unilater-
ally or jointly can exercise a degree of owner-
ship control over their partners (Geringer &
Hebert, 1989; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Harrigan,
1986; Hennart, 1991; Killing, 1983; Pisano,
1989). Firms have greatest need of such equity
holdings in the case of link alliances, when
they face greater uncertainty about the re-
sources that alliance activities might create
and about unwanted resource transfers. In
scale alliances, by contrast, the ownership
costs that equity holdings entail will often
out-weigh protection value.
Hypothesis 4. Parent equity holdings will
be more common in link alliances than in
scale alliances.
By contrast with equity holdings, the for-
mation of a joint venture, rather than simply
undertaking a contractual relationship, may
provide coordination and creation roles, as
well as a protection mechanism. A joint
venture provides a protection mechanism by
giving the partners’ direct influence over
alliance activities via their financial stake in
the joint venture (Williamson, 1983). A joint
venture also provides coordination and cre-
ation roles by forming a focal entity to which
the allies can direct their human resources
and other assets for the alliance’s efforts to
combine their existing resources and possibly
create new resources (Killing, 1983; Geringer
& Hebert, 1989; Oxley, 2001). The coordination
and creation roles can include both manage-
ment of the use of the allies’ resources and,
in some cases, active functional use of the
partners’ resources in a joint venture facility.
It is not clear whether joint ventures will be
more common for different types of alliances.
Scale alliances require that the firms pool
their similar resources and actively undertake
coordinated use of the resources in order to
achieve greater scale efficiencies. A joint
venture organization provides a mechanism
for coordinating this joint use. Some link
Table 2b. Alliance Governance Mechanisms
H Alliance governance mechanisms Type Resource governance roles: Protection, coordination, creation
H4 Parent equity holdings Link Protection: Protect the value of resources that alliance activities might create (less
incentive to incur ownership costs in scale alliances).
H5a Unbalanced joint ventures Link Protection & creation: Create and protect new resources that arise from
complementary resources (may also coordinate use of similar resources but unbalanced
structure is less necessary in such cases).
H5b Balanced joint ventures Scale Coordination: Coordination while using similar resources in scale allliances, which
incur fewer appropriation risks than link alliances.
H6 Sequential joint ventures Scale Coordination: Coordinate use of similar resources in scale alliances. Uncommon for
link alliances, because sequential joint ventures raise appropriation risks without
providing functional organization to create new resources.
Integrated joint ventures Both Coordination & creation: Coordination while using similar resources in scale alliances;
creation while using complementary resources in link alliances.
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alliances, by contrast, may require less joint
use of the allies’ resources than in the case of
scale alliances. Instead, the allies may often be
able to use contractual relationships to govern
the complementary use of their resources that
the firms draw upon at different stages in the
production process. The resource creation
activities of such link alliances may then tend
to take place within the parent firms, rather
than within a joint venture entity. None-
theless, many link alliances will require
interaction among the partners in order to
create resources, so that joint ventures might
well be equally common for link alliances as
for scale alliances.
Once one makes the first distinction between
joint ventures versus contractual alliances,
different forms of joint ventures provide
insights concerning firms attempt to balance
the protection, coordination, and creation
incentives. Two variants of joint ventures are
particularly interesting in this context.
The first variant concerns balanced and
unbalanced joint ventures. Unbalanced joint
ventures, which are joint ventures in which
one partner has greater share of equity than
other partners, provide the leading share-
holder with greater resource protection than
balanced joint ventures because the greater
ownership share allows some degree of
unilateral control. We expect unbalanced joint
ventures to be common in the case of link
alliances, in which concerns about losing the
value of key resources to a partner are par-
ticularly strong. By contrast, firms will tend to
use balanced joint ventures for scale alliances,
to which firms contribute similar resources
and need have less concern about appropri-
ation by a partner.
Hypothesis 5a. Unbalanced joint ventures
will be more common in link alliances than
in scale alliances.
Hypothesis 5b. Balanced joint ventures
will be more common in scale alliances
than in link alliances.
The second variant compares integrative
and sequential joint ventures. Integrative joint
ventures are joint ventures that create a stand-
alone alliance organization, while sequential
joint ventures are ventures in which each
partner carries out part of the alliance activities
within its own facility and then passes that part
on to its partner for further activity (Park and
Russo, 1996). In an integrative joint venture,
the joint venture organization has the poten-
tial to provide hands-on coordination and
creation roles in the joint use of the firms’
resources, while the joint venture organization
for a sequential joint venture coordinates only
the establishment of legal and functional
cooperation frameworks. Owing to the dis-
tinct organizational presence of integrative
joint ventures, which blend personnel and
other resources of the parents, such ventures
provide greater opportunities than sequential
joint ventures for the partners to combine
their resources.
We expect sequential joint ventures to be
particularly uncommon in link alliances.
Sequential joint ventures provide only a co-
ordinating organization, without providing a
functional organization for resource creation.
Link alliances are likely to rely on either con-
tractual relationships or integrative joint ven-
tures, rather than sequential joint ventures.
Integrative joint ventures will be appropriate
for link alliances in which the partners require
active ongoing coordination of the combina-
tion of their complementary resources. Con-
tractual alliances will be appropriate for link
alliances in which the partners are more in-
terested in learning from each others’ re-
sources than in undertaking joint combination,
and can rely on individual-level coordination
to achieve the desired learning. Moreover,
sequential alliances involve the risk of creating
a coordinating organization that may allow
competitors to gain substantial access to re-
sources that the competitors lack, and thereby
risk appropriation of the value of the resources,
without the benefit of providing a functional
organization that can create new resources in
which all partners will have an ownership
share. Therefore, few link alliances will be
sequential joint ventures.
Hypothesis 6. Sequential joint ventures will
be more common in scale alliances than in
link alliances.
By contrast, integrative joint ventures may
arise for both scale alliances and link alliances.
Scale alliances may use integrative joint
ventures in order to achieve functional co-
ordination of their similar resources and
thereby obtain scale economies. As we noted
above, link alliances may use integrative joint
ventures in order to combine dissimilar and
complementary resources in order to create
new resources.
In summary, this section argues that differ-
ent governance mechanisms address different
elements of coordination, creation, and protec-
tion in the use of the resources that competing
firms contribute to alliances. We argue that
firms can at least partly achieve the joint
needs of resource coordination, creation, and
protection, counter to arguments that the goals
tend to be opposed (e.g., Ghoshal & Moran,
1996; Sobrero & Roberts, 1996). Parent equity
holdings emphasize protection mechanisms.
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Joint ventures provide coordination and
creation mechanism, but may also create
appropriation risks, which will be particu-
larly prevalent for link alliances. Balanced
joint ventures and sequential joint ventures,
which raise appropriation risks, will tend to
be suited to coordination and pooling of
similar resources in scale alliances. Unbalanced
joint ventures, which provide protection
mechanisms for one of the parents, will tend
to be suited to the creation of new resources
from recombination of complementary re-
sources in link alliances. Integrative joint
ventures provide opportunities to either co-
ordinate the use of similar resources or create
new resources from complementary re-
sources. Empirically, we will also examine
how combinations of the governance mechan-
isms align with scale and link alliances. It is
possible that combinations of mechanisms
that emphasize protection will tend to align
with link alliances (e.g., parent equity hold-
ings and unbalanced joint ventures), while
combinations that emphasize coordination
benefits for similar resources will tend to align
with scale alliances (e.g., balance sequential
joint ventures).
Overall, this paper focuses on how the
functional and geographic resource scope of
the alliances and parent firms distinguish
competitors’ strategic objectives to coordinate
the use of existing resources and to create
new resources. The predictions address the
opportunities and risks that firms face when
they form alliances with competitors. The
study helps describe the multiple roles that
alliances between competitors play in modern
economies, as firms attempt to reinforce their
strategic positions in their existing markets
and expand throughout the world.
Data, Variables, And Statistical
Methods
We tested our hypotheses on a set of 227
alliances among competing firms in a range of
manufacturing industries. We define strategic
alliances as arrangements between two or
more independent companies that choose to
carry out a project or operate in a specific
business area by coordinating the necessary
skills and resources jointly rather than either
operating on their own or merging their oper-
ations. The alliances in our sample include
equity joint ventures as well as contractual
partnerships that did not entail the formation
of a separate legal entity.
The alliances in this study involved partner-
ships between competitors, that is, firms that
operated in the same industries. We based
industry categorization on descriptions of the
alliances’ business areas. The industry defini-
tions approximate a three-digit to four-digit
level in the U.S. Standard Industrial Categor-
ization classification, although we did not use
formal SIC-type classifications because of the
international nature of the data and of
inconsistencies and unavailability of different
national classification systems. The most
frequent industry in our analysis is telecom-
electronics (35 percent), followed by auto-
mobiles (29 percent), aerospace (19 percent)
and a mixture of other industries, such as
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, chemicals,
and foods (17 percent). Business areas in the
telecom-electronics cases included public
switching equipment, PBX, radiotelephone
equipment, mainframe computers, personal
computers, consumer electronics, and semi-
conductors. Business areas in the auto in-
dustry cases included cars, trucks, engines,
and transmissions. Business areas in the
aerospace cases included commercial air-
planes, military airplanes, airplane engines,
helicopters, helicopter engines, missiles, and
spacecraft. For each alliance, we checked
secondary sources, industry analysts, and
executives to determine that each partner
had prior activities in the alliance business
area.
The alliances in the sample involve partner
firms from North America (U.S. and Canada),
Western Europe (Sweden, Italy, Britain,
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain,
Switzerland, and Finland), or Asia (Japan
and Korea) and entail operations in one of
these three continental zones. We included
only agreements that operated within at least
one of the partners’ home markets. Thus, we
excluded agreements such as the General
Motors-Toyota joint venture in Australia and
the Autolatina alliance that Ford and Volks-
wagen formed in Brazil and Argentina. We
also did not collect information on agreements
concerning the supply of components and sub-
assemblies from one manufacturer to another
because such exchanges are closer to market
transactions than to strategic alliances. In
addition, we excluded government-sponsored
research consortia, such as those sponsored
by the European Commission and by MITI in
Japan. The resulting data focus on strategic
alliances that involve the partners’ core
businesses and markets.
Each data point in our sample corresponds
to an agreement between two or more
partners, covering a specific business area.
For example, in aerospace we considered
agreements involving commercial airplanes,
military airplanes, airplane engines, heli-
copters, helicopter engines, missiles and
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spacecraft. Each alliance operates in one of the
three above-mentioned geographic zones. To
identify alliances in which reorganizations
occurred, we categorized collaborative activ-
ities into four main functions, including R&D,
manufacturing, assembly, and marketing.
Each alliance corresponds to a specific alloca-
tion of R&D, manufacturing, assembly, and
marketing activities among the partners.
Thus, an alliance between an American and
a European telecommunications equipment
manufacturer by which they each agree to
market one of the other’s products in their
respective home markets would include two
cases: one in which the European partner
markets the American system in Europe, and
a second in which the American partner
markets the European system in North
America.
We gathered the data for the study from
secondary sources such as industry reports,
publications of manufacturers’ associations,
and journals specializing in specific indus-
tries. Examples of the publications include
Automotive News or Aviation Week and Space
Technology. Reports of all the alliances in the
sample occurred in published sources. Trade
associations and private research institutes
publish annual updates on alliances and
collaborative ventures for the industries that
account for a significant portion of our sample
(automobile, aerospace, telecom-electronics),
which makes it possible to trace alliance
formation, reorganization, and termination
on a yearly basis. In addition, when informa-
tion necessary for our study was not available
from these sources, we complemented the
data by interviewing industry analysts and
company executives. Park and Russo (1996)
report using a similar supplementary inter-
view approach to complement archival source
data. To avoid perception biases, we relied on
variables describing a factual event or situa-
tion, rather than using variables that reflected
managers’ opinions.
Alliance formation variables and methods
The dependent variable for the empirical
analysis of alliance formation is the alliance
type. We set a dummy variable equal to 1 for
link alliances and 0 for scale alliances. To do
this, we classified possible contributions to an
alliance into three categories that distinguished
between technical, production, and marketing
activities: (i) research, technology develop-
ment, and product design, (ii) manufacturing
facilities and resources, and (iii) marketing
and sales networks and resources. We then
examined the respective contributions of each
partner. When, based on the three categories,
all the contributions of the partners over-
lapped, we considered a partnership to be a
scale alliance. When, in at least one of the
three categories, all contributions came from
one partner, we considered a partnership to
be of a link alliance. Two authors of this study
each coded the variable independently. We
then asked an industry expert to indepen-
dently classify alliances in the automobile,
aerospace, data processing, electronics, and
telecom industries. After undertaking this
process, we dropped eleven ambiguous cases
because of conflicting coding. Table 3a reports
summary statistics for the alliance formation
variables.
We recognize that the routines that comprise
resources within a common category will differ
across firms. For instance, the routines that
make up the marketing resources of one firm
will differ from the routines that make up the
marketing resources of another firm. The
differences among the routines thus provide
an aspect of link alliance to all alliances among
firms. However, an assumption concerning
the alliance categorization is that the routines
that comprise the resources within a common
category are more alike than the routines that
comprise resources in different categories. This
assumption allows us to classify alliances that
involve resources within common categories
as scale alliances.
We defined several variables to address the
predictions concerning alliance formation.
We defined three dummy variables to denote
alliance activities, based on whether the
alliance involved R&D, production, and/or
marketing activities. We considered a function
to be within the scope of the alliance if the
firms performed the tasks pertaining to this
function as a direct element of the alliance’s
activities. For example, if firms formed an
alliance to market an existing product in a
new geographic zone, we considered the
alliance to involve marketing but not R&D.
If the alliance led to the development of a new
product, then we considered its scope to
encompass R&D. We defined several vari-
ables for geographic coverage of the alliance
and the allies. We determined whether the
market of the alliance covered Europe, Asia,
North America, or a combination of these
zones. Three variables denoted alliances, such
as the Rover Honda and NUMMI alliances,
that sold goods only within one continent. A
comparison variable denoted alliances, such
as Airbus, that also sold their output outside
the continent in which the firms based the
alliance. We defined four 0–1 dummy vari-
ables to denote partnerships involving parent
firms from the same country, same continent,
or different continents.
CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 12
Volume 11 Number 3 September 2002 # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002UNCORRECTED PROOF
Table 3a. Summary Statistics for Link Formation Variables (N=227)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 Link alliances 1 71.00 70.61 70.16 0.41 70.27 0.05 0.21 0.06 70.51 0.04 0.30 0.32 70.13 70.44 0.42 0.14 0.01 70.01
2 Scale alliances 71.00 1 0.61 0.16 70.41 0.27 70.05 70.21 70.06 0.51 70.04 70.30 70.32 0.13 0.44 70.42 70.14 70.01 0.01
3 R&D activities 70.61 0.61 1 0.24 70.12 0.18 70.05 70.18 70.19 0.40 0.04 70.21 70.39 0.02 0.33 70.41 0.05 0.16 70.16
4 Production activities 70.16 0.16 0.24 1 0.30 0.02 70.31 0.11 70.27 0.19 0.10 70.18 70.21 70.12 0.18 70.18 0.08 70.07 0.07
5 Marketing activities 0.41 70.41 70.12 0.30 1 70.17 70.08 0.21 0.05 70.13 70.08 0.12 0.15 70.29 70.01 0.14 0.09 70.23 0.23
6 Multi-firm alliances 70.27 0.27 0.18 0.02 70.17 1 70.15 70.09 0.04 0.25 70.10 70.14 70.06 0.00 0.17 70.13 70.06 70.04 0.04
7 Year of formation 0.05 70.05 70.05 70.31 70.08 70.15 1 70.05 0.10 70.28 0.18 0.03 0.11 0.07 70.13 0.01 0.07 0.11 70.11
8 Competitive asymmetry 0.21 70.21 70.18 0.11 0.21 70.09 70.05 1 0.08 0.00 70.02 0.02 0.02 70.04 70.16 0.07 0.14 0.02 70.02
9 Prior alliances among partners 0.06 70.06 70.19 70.27 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.08 1 70.10 70.03 0.04 0.13 70.07 0.07 0.08 70.11 70.10 0.10
10 Zone, global 70.51 0.51 0.40 0.19 70.13 0.25 70.28 0.00 70.10 1 70.55 70.28 70.28 0.08 0.22 70.25 70.03 70.23 0.23
11 Single zone, Europe 0.04 70.04 0.04 0.10 70.08 70.10 0.18 70.02 70.03 70.55 1 70.33 70.33 70.11 0.13 70.15 0.11 0.38 70.38
12 Single zone, North America 0.30 70.30 70.21 70.18 0.12 70.14 0.03 0.02 0.04 70.28 70.33 1 70.17 0.10 70.25 0.07 0.12 70.07 0.07
13 Single zone, Asia 0.32 70.32 70.39 70.21 0.15 70.06 0.11 0.02 0.13 70.28 70.33 70.17 1 70.05 70.22 0.48 70.23 70.15 0.15
14 Parent same continent 70.13 0.13 0.02 70.12 70.29 0.00 0.07 70.04 70.07 0.08 70.11 0.10 70.05 1 70.28 70.25 70.21 70.06 0.06
15 Parent inter-continent 70.44 0.44 0.33 0.18 70.01 0.17 70.13 70.16 0.07 0.22 0.13 70.25 70.22 70.28 1 70.46 70.40 70.03 0.03
16 Parent inter-continent, Asia 0.42 70.42 70.41 70.18 0.14 70.13 0.01 0.07 0.08 70.25 70.15 0.07 0.48 70.25 70.46 1 70.36 70.05 0.05
17 Parent inter-continent, Eur-NAm 0.14 70.14 0.05 0.08 0.09 70.06 0.07 0.14 70.11 70.03 0.11 70.12 70.23 70.21 70.40 70.36 1 0.13 70.13
18 Industry telecom-electronics 0.01 70.01 0.16 70.07 70.23 70.04 0.11 0.02 70.10 70.23 0.38 70.07 70.15 70.06 70.03 70.05 0.13 1 71.00
19 Other industries 70.01 0.01 70.16 0.07 0.23 0.04 70.11 70.02 0.10 0.23 70.38 0.07 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.05 70.13 71.00 1
Mean 0.52 0.48 0.53 0.63 0.79 0.11 82.8 0.743 0.21 0.32 0.39 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.35 0.65
s.d. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.41 0.31 8.3 0.44 0.41 0.47 0.49 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.48 0.46 0.43 0.48 0.48
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 1 96 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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We defined several variables to address
other formation factors, including multi-firm
alliances, alliance founding year, competitive
asymmetry, alliance experience, and industry
identity. A 0–1 dummy variable denoted
alliances that had more than two partners.
We defined a variable to denote the calendar
year in which the firms founded the alliance.
We defined a variable to denote the com-
petitive asymmetry of the partners. We oper-
ationalized the concept of asymmetry by
comparing the sales of the partner firms in
the industry in which the firms created the
alliance. The asymmetry measure is appro-
priate because the alliance partners compete
in the same industries and product lines,
which we checked from secondary sources,
industry analysts, and company executives.
We considered a partnership to be asym-
metric when, at the time the firms created the
alliance, the sales in the focal industry of one
of the partner firms were at least twice as
large as the sales of the other partner. Franko
(1971) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987)
used similar factors. The alliance experience
variable noted whether two or more of the
partners in an alliance had formed an alliance
with each other within the ten years before
the formation of the focal alliance. Finally, to
address industry differences and to investi-
gate alliances in the telecom sector, which is
the largest sector in our data and has been
particularly dynamic (Garrette & Quelin,
1994), we defined two 0–1 dummy variables
to distinguish alliances set up in the telecom-
electronics industry and in other sectors.
We used maximum likelihood binomial
logistic regression to test the formation propo-
sitions. The logistic regression models took
the form Ln Pi/(1-Pi) = bXi. In this equation,
Pi is the probability that alliance i will be a
link or scale alliances. A vector of covariates
Xi with coefficient vector b, including an
intercept, linearly affects the log odds of the
probability. The effect of a one-unit change of
covariate j on the probability that an alliance
will be a particular type is bjPi(1-Pi). We used
the logistic regression procedure of the SAS
statistical package to obtain the estimates.
Logistic regression provides a well-accepted
technique for estimating the likelihood that
discrete outcomes will occur.
Governance mechanism variables and
methods
To test the governance mechanism predic-
tions, we defined several dummy variables
for parent equity holdings and the various
types of joint ventures. An equity variable
took a value of 1 if an alliance partner held
equity in the other parent. A joint venture
variable denoted if the alliance took the form
of an equity joint venture organization. We
distinguished between balanced and unbal-
anced joint venture ownership where, in the
case of two partner alliances, balanced owner-
ship corresponds to 50—50 joint ventures. We
distinguished between integrative and se-
quential joint ventures (Park & Russo, 1996).
Integrative joint ventures assign alliance manu-
facturing activities to a jointly owned joint
venture facility. In sequential joint ventures,
the firms allocate all activities to individual
partners in a sequential path, with no joint
operations within a separate joint venture
facility. We also created two-way interaction
terms among the governance mechanisms
that had consistent direction for their single
variable predictions to test for augmenting
joint relationships among governance modes.
We then used the alliance type (link or scale)
variable that we described earlier as the inde-
pendent variable for the governance analysis.
Table 3b reports summary statistics for the
governance variables.
We chose a correlation approach to test the
governance mechanisms hypotheses. In this
approach, we estimated correlation relation-
ships between each governance mechanism
and the alliance type variable. Each of the
mechanisms represents a different outcome
choice, so that a more complicated approach
to the statistical analysis would require a
large number of models. Moreover, we view
link formation and governance as a two-stage
process in which firms first chose an alliance
type, depending on their strategic objectives,
and then chose a governance mode that is
appropriate for the type of alliance. That is,
we view resource characteristics as the deter-
minant of alliance type, with alliance type
then determining governance mode. With this
two-stage approach, the appropriate test of
the governance hypotheses is to examine the
simple relationships between alliance type
and governance mode, rather than undertake
a more complicated analysis in which alliance
type and resource characteristics jointly de-
termine governance mode. Indeed, such a
multiple regression approach would entail
endogeneity among the independent vari-
ables on the right hand side of the regression
equations.
In summary, we have gathered data that is
highly relevant to testing the hypotheses that
we develop in this paper. The data include
more than 200 alliances among competing
firms from Europe, North America, and Asia,
in several industrial sectors. The data provide
operational measures of alliance types, re-
source characteristics, and alliance governance
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mechanisms. The sample supports the use of
straightforward statistical techniques to test
the hypotheses.
Results
Alliance formation
Table 4 reports the results of the alliance
formation analysis. The results provide strong
support for most formation hypotheses. The
overall statistical fit of the models is reason-
able, with pseudo R-square statistics (the
proportion of the loglikelihood of a model
with no covariates that the reported model
explains) of 0.64.
The results in Table 4 are consistent with
both geographic resource predictions. As
hypothesis 1a predicted, allies with different
geographic origins are most likely to form
link alliances. The results apply to parents
that have home bases on different continents,
with similar results for intercontinental alli-
ances involving Asian, European, and North
American firms. The parent geographic dis-
persion result does not hold for parents from
different countries within the same continent,
likely because there has been substantial
diffusion of resources among countries within
Europe and within North America.
As hypothesis 1b predicted, Table 4 shows
that alliances with narrower geographic cover-
Table 4. Logistic Regression Estimates of Associations with Link and Scale Alliances
Link
prediction
Coef s.e.
Parent geographic origin
Parent same continent (a) H1a + 70.55 0.87
Parent inter-continent, Asia (a) H1a ++ 1.71 0.89 *
Parent inter-continent, Eur-
NAm(a)
H1a ++ 1.67 0.87 *
Alliance geographic market
Single zone, Europe (b) H1b ++ 2.18 0.69 ***
Single zone, North America (b) H1b ++ 3.39 1.06 ***
Single zone, Asia (b) H1b ++ 2.02 1.07 *
Alliance functional resources (c)
R&D resources H2a – 73.12 0.85 ***
Production resources H2b – 71.93 0.72 ***
Marketing resources H2c + 3.79 1.06 ***
Production & marketing resources 2.50 0.79 ***
R&D, production, marketing 71.24 0.48 ***
Competitive asymmetry H3a + 0.87 0.64 #
Multi-firm alliances H3b – 71.70 1.16 #
Other factors
Year of formation 70.10 0.04 ***
Prior alliances among partners 70.10 0.04 ***
Industry telecom-electronics (d) 1.02 0.60 *
Intercept 5.96 3.20 *
Loglikelihood ratio 201.8 ***
Cases (Link alliances) 227 (118)
Pseudo R-square 0.64
(a) Compared to parents from the same country
(b) Compared to market coverage that extends beyond a single continent
(c) Resource variables are mutually-exclusive mean effects dummy variables.
(d) Compared to industries other than telecom-electronics (auto, aerospace, other)
*p 5.10, ** p5.05, *** p5.01 (two-tailed tests of coefficients; one tailed test of loglikelihood ratio chi-
square); # p5.10 (one-tail
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age tend to be link alliances. Alliances that
limit coverage to only a single continent,
whether the continent be Asia, Europe, or
North America, are more likely to be link
alliances, while alliances that provide market
coverage beyond a single continent tend to be
scale alliances.
The results in Table 4 are also consistent
with the functional resource predictions. As
hypotheses 2a and 2b predicted, firms are
unlikely to employ R&D or production
resources in link alliances. As hypothesis 2c
predicted, firms tend to employ marketing
resources in link alliances. The table also
examines cases in which alliances involve
more than one type of resource. The results
show that the marketing influence towards
link alliances tends to drive alliances that
combine production and marketing re-
sources. By contrast, alliances that combine
all three types of resources tend to be scale
alliances, likely because of the concern about
R&D appropriation that arises in link alli-
ances among competitors.
The results in Table 4 moderately support
hypotheses 3a and 3b, concerning competitive
asymmetry and number of partners. As ex-
pected, we find that alliances among partners
with asymmetric competitive positions tend
to be link alliances, although with only
moderate significance. Similarly, alliances
involving multiple partners tend to be scale
alliances, with moderate significance.
The other factors in column 1a also reveal
influences on alliance formation. Link alli-
ances are less common in more recent years.
Link alliances are also moderately less com-
mon when the partners have previous experi-
ence with each other. The telecom-electronics
industry variable shows that link alliances are
more common in that sector than in the other
industries. The recent technical, market, regu-
latory, and competitive dynamics of the
telecom-electronics sector appears to have
driven a greater need for expansion-oriented
link alliances, which provide opportunities to
recombine resources and create new resources
that attempt to respond to the rapidly changing
environment.
Overall, the alliance formation results in
Table 4 show that how firms apply geographic
and functional resources has strong influences
on the types of alliances that they form. Link
alliances are most common with parents from
different continents, with alliances that in-
volve marketing resources, and with alliances
among competitors with asymmetric compe-
titive strength. Scale alliances are most com-
mon for alliances with multi-continental
market coverage and for alliances involving
R&D or production resources.
Governance mechanisms
Table 5 reports the governance mechanism
results, showing the correlations between link
alliances and the different governance mech-
anisms. The correlations provide support for
most predictions, with some intriguing differ-
ences emerging across the industry sub-
samples. As hypothesis 4 predicted, link alli-
ances tend to associate with parent equity
holding. We also find that joint ventures are
more common among scale alliances, which
we posed as an empirical question. As hypoth-
esis 5a predicted, unbalanced joint ventures
are somewhat more common among link
alliances, although this result is not statistically
significant. As hypothesis 5b predicted, bal-
anced joint ventures are more common among
scale alliances. Consistent with hypothesis 6,
sequential joint ventures are most common
for scale alliances. Finally, consistent with our
arguments, integrative joint ventures associ-
ate with both types of alliances.
The analysis of interactions among govern-
ance mechanisms offers additional insights.
Firms appear to use the basic protection
mechanisms we discussed earlier predomi-
nantly as substitutes for one another rather
than in a cumulative way. This implication
emerges from the observation that the single
variable correlations with link alliances tend
to be about as strong as the interactions of two
or more variables that have the same pre-
dicted relationship with link alliances. In-
deed, we find that the combination of equity
holdings and unbalanced joint ventures has
no significant relationship with link alliances.
Link alliances tend to include one form of
protection, i.e., equity holdings or unbalanced
joint ventures, but do not systematically
combine the two forms of protection. Scale
alliances, in which unwanted resource trans-
fers are a less salient issue, are more likely to
combine governance mechanisms that offer a
low level of protection and also offer oppor-
tunities for coordination via joint ventures.
Nonetheless, the strength of the statistical
relationship is similar to those that we found
with the individual coordination mechanisms
of balanced joint ventures and sequential joint
ventures.
Overall, the correlations between alliance
types and governance mechanisms are only
moderately strong. A likely explanation is
that firms address many of their concerns
about resource protection when they under-
take alliances with competitors through the
choice of the most appropriate alliance type
and through the nature of the resources they
contribute to the alliance, as much as through
specific safeguard mechanisms. For instance,
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to limit the risk of appropriation, firms avoid
contributing R&D resources in the context of
link alliances, as the results of hypothesis 2a
in Table 4 show. If firms tend not to contri-
bute sensitive resources to alliances that would
encompass strong appropriation hazards, then
the need for highly protective governance
mechanisms is limited. This suggests that firms
do not rely primarily on governance mechan-
isms to protect the value of the resources they
own or of resources they create through col-
laboration with competitors.
Our study of alliances between competing
firms suggests that a fundamental choice
firms make in alliances involves the resources
they are willing to share with a partner rather
than solely the organization they set up to
protect the value of these resources. This
result at first might appear to contradict the
view that ‘the best strategy is to organize and
operate efficiently’ (Williamson, 1991b). Our
results, though, are consistent with William-
son’s (1975, 1985) arguments concerning in-
centives for internal organization versus
external forms of organization. That is, firms
appear to be more likely to retain internal
control of resources that would be difficult to
protect via contractual safeguards. Overall, the
choice of alliance type and resource contribu-
tions suggests that firms make such decisions
in anticipation of maneuvering and strategiz-
ing during interactions with competitors.
The results suggest limits to the ability of
contractual relationships such as equity hold-
ings in partners and majority holdings in joint
ventures to provide safeguards in inter-
organizational alliances. If firms anticipated
that it would be possible to create strong
protection mechanisms for most alliances
with competitors, then they could chose to
economize by contributing and combining
any under-utilized resources with any rele-
vant partner in any type of alliance. In such
cases, the links between parent firm features
and alliance type on the one hand, and
between resources contributed and alliance
type on the other hand would then be weak.
In contrast, the link between resource appro-
priation hazards and governance mechanisms
would be strong. Instead, we found results in
support of both the formation and govern-
ance predictions, suggesting that firms both
attempt to take appropriation risks into
account when forming alliances and then
attempt to choose governance mechanisms
that address protection concerns, along with
resource coordination and creation oppor-
tunities.
2
Conclusion
This study uses a competence perspective on
firm strategy to develop hypotheses concern-
ing alliance formation and governance. We
start with the assumption of bounded ration-
ality by potentially self-interested actors who
face firm-specific limits on their foresight.
Table 5. Correlations Between Alliance Type and Governance Mechanisms
Variables (n=227) Hypothesis Correlation
with link alliance
Governance mechanisms
Parent equity holding H4 + 0.18
Joint venture (v. Contract alliance) 70.12
Unbalanced joint venture H5a + 0.08
Balanced joint venture H5b – 70.20
Sequential JV (Coordination organization) H6 – 70.13
Integrative JV (Coordination & functional org.) 70.04
Governance mechanism interactions
Equity holding * Unbalanced jV H4 & 5a +,+ 0.01
Nonequity * Balanced JV H4 & 5b –,– 70.16
Nonequity * Sequential JV H4 & 6 –,– 70.13
Balanced JV * Sequential JV H5b & 6 –,– 70.20
Nonequity * Balanced JV * Sequential JV H4, 5b, & 6 –,–,– 70.17
p50.10 in bold typeface
CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 18
Volume 11 Number 3 September 2002 # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002UNCORRECTED PROOF
We then focus on routines and resources as
the fundamental units of analysis for firm
strategy, while viewing firms as structures for
governing routines and resources. We argue
that resource governance has three aspects,
including resource coordination, creation,
and protection. We argue that the alliances
firms form with their competitors will at-
tempt to govern resource use in a way that
economizes on resource coordination, creation,
and protection. We find that firms tend to
contribute different types of resources to link
and scale alliances with competitors: firms
primarily contribute R&D and production
resources to scale alliances, and marketing
resources to link alliances. This is consistent
with the argument that different resources
both offer different opportunities for resource
coordination and creation and also create
different appropriation risks. We also find
that firms tend to use different governance
mechanisms for link and scale alliances: firms
are more likely to choose stronger protection
mechanisms for link alliances which create
greater appropriation risks, and tend to seek
higher levels of coordination in scale alliances.
This is consistent with the argument that the
governance mechanisms provide differential
opportunities to coordinate, create, and protect
resources.
We view this research as part of an emerging
stream of work that is attempting to develop
a more detailed conceptual basis for under-
standing the business organization. We believe
that such work needs to grapple with the joint
demands of conceptual clarity on the one
hand and managerial ambiguity on the other.
That is, a central challenge that faces re-
searchers who are developing routine-based
theories of the firm lies in defining a cumu-
lative set of concepts and measures, while
retaining key inter-connections among the
factors that managers must address when
they make decisions about what their firms
will do.
Notes
1. Link alliances that involve only marketing
resources are alliances in which one partner
provides a marketing system and the other
partner provides the alliance with an existing
product that the firm produces itself.
2. We also tested for the cases in which links
between alliance type and governance mechan-
isms on those alliances did not fit the dominant
model (link alliances including R&D, multi-
partner link alliances or scale alliances includ-
ing marketing), finding no relationship with
governance mechanisms.
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